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Untangling Historical Injustice and Historical Ill
by PD Dr. Michael Schefczyk
bstract: This article distinguishes histo-
rical ills and historical injustices. It
conceives the latter as legalised natural
crimes, committed by morally competent agents. A
natural crime consists in the deliberate violation
of a natural right. ‘Legalised’ means that the na-
tural crime must be prescribed, permitted or tole-
rated by the legal system. I advocate an approach
which assesses moral competence on the basis of
an exposedness criterion, that is: a historical agent
must not be blamed for failing to see the right
moral reasons if his epoch and social world is ut-
terly unacquainted with these reasons. However,
an appropriate application of the exposedness cri-
terion should take social factors and psychological
mechanisms into account that obstruct access to
the right reasons. I state a number of factors that
seem to be auspicious for the development of
moral competence.1
Some decades ago, Robert Penn Warren de-
cried the “whole notion of untangling the
‘debts’ of history” as a “grisly farce”.2 One rea-
son for scepticism with respect to the notion
of historical justice has to do with unresolved
problems of definition. Surprisingly, the phi-
losophical literature lacks a debate on the defi-
ning features of historical injustice. My paper
responds to this deficit by oﬀering a working
definition of the term. The proposed definition
captures core cases of historical injustice, but
avoids serious problems of the prevailing ‘in-
tuitive’ usage. 
In some instances, the intuitive approach gives
rise to the following dilemma: It either ascri-
bes contemporary conceptions of justice to
 his torical agents who do not share them;
hence, one horn of the dilemma is anachro-
nism; or it assumes that the actions of histori-
cal agents were unjust even though they were
not acquainted with the conception of justice
which we, here and now, apply. This amounts
to the violation of a fundamental principle of
fairness, namely that the agent must know the
standards which are used in order to evaluate
his or her behaviour. Hence, the other horn of
the dilemma is unfairness. In order to avoid
this dilemma, the paper introduces a di-
stinction between historical injustices and hi-
storical ills. 
The paper is structured as follows: The first sec-
tion titled ‘Distinguishing historical ill and hi-
storical injustice’ introduces what I call a
responsibility-centred approach (RCA). Accor-
ding to RCA, historical injustice presupposes
that a class or group of persons bears moral re-
sponsibility. The second section ‘A working de-
finition of historical injustice’ defines historical
injustice as a particular form of political crime.
On this basis, the third section titled‘ Moral
competence’ advocates a ‘contextualist’ ap-
proach regarding the moral competence and
responsibility of historical agents. 
Distinguishing historical ill and historical
injustice
How do we decide whether a historical event
or institution should count as an instance of
historical injustice? Historical injustices are,
from a moral point of view, bad or ill states of
the world. They are historical ills. As examples
for bad- or ill-making features of a society take
the exploitation of the rural population, the
subjection of woman or, due to enormous
ignorance, harmful medical practice.3 Other
things being equal, a moral chooser would pre-
fer a world without these
practices and structures
to a world with them. 
However, not all histori-
cal ills should count as
historical injustices. In
the following, I propose
a responsibility-centred approach (RCA). RCA
reserves the term ‘historical injustice’ for cases
in which a class or group of persons bears
moral responsibility for a historical ill. I shall
advocate a version of RCA, which specifies the
notion of ill-making properties on the basis of
a natural rights approach. People have some
elementary rights, such as the right not to be
mutilated, murdered, displaced, exploited,
raped, captured, robbed or enslaved. The vio-
lation of these rights is an ill-making feature in
the relevant sense.
The advantage of this version of RCA consists
in the fact that the idea of elementary indivi-
dual rights is arguably less contended than any
theory of justice. Thus, basing RCA on a na-
tural rights approach gives us a relatively ro-
bust notion of historical injustice. 
The distinction between historical ills and his -
torical injustices allows for specifying appro-
priate reactions to the violation of natural
rights. A class or group of agents that are res -
ponsible for a historical injustice are obliged to
repair the damage and to ‘restore equality’ with
the victim. The fact that the members of this
group or class have acted unjustly gives them a
special reason to care for correcting the inju-
stice. In other words, reparative justice regar-
ding historical injustice is a special obligation.
In some cases of historical ill, however, there is
no group or class of persons that bears moral
responsibility and is, thus, to blame. Those
who were privileged by the unjust structures
without being responsible for them (the profi-
teers of historical ill) do not deserve to be pu-
nished. Profiteers have neither a special
obligation to rectify past ills nor have they a
special claim on keeping their advantages. I call
the latter the invalidation eﬀect of historical ill.
Historical ill invalidates entitlement claims on
the part of the advantaged members of society
that otherwise come into play in judgements
about the just distribution of resources. In
other words, deliberation on redistribution po-
licy has, under such circumstances, not to ba-
lance general-right based arguments against
reasons of historical entitlement.4
In contrast, blameworthy perpetrators of hi-
storical injustice deserve punishment and have
special obligations of reparative justice. Where -
as historical ill invalidates or enfeebles entitle-
ment claims on the part of the profiteers,
historical injustice strengthens entitlement
claims on the part of the victims. I call this the
amplification eﬀect of historical injustice. In such
cases, deliberation on redistribution policy
gives special weight to reasons of reparative ju-
stice, which are a form of historical entitle-
ment. 
A working definition of historical injustice
The natural rights-based version of RCA I am
proposing, conceives ‘historical injustice’ to be
a form of political crime. Acts of historical in-
justice have to be distinguished from ‘ordinary
political crimes’, such as the assassination of
tsar Alexander II or the Lockerbie bombing.
This distinction is not a matter of magnitude.
Presumably, most people would not call the
A
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5terror attacks of September 11 an instance of
historical injustice, in spite of the fact that the
death toll was on a similar scale as that of the
Herero campaign.5 The distinction is also not
a matter of ‘historical significance’. September
11 is of considerable importance for the histo-
rical narrative and collective self-understanding
of Americans and for the course of internatio-
nal aﬀairs in the foreseeable future. Notwith-
standing, presumably very few would call it a
case of historical injustice.
What distinguishes historical injustices from
ordinary political crimes is their relation to the
legal order. Terrorist acts are ordinary crimes in
the sense that they are illegal and that the per-
petrators are aware of that. In contrast, histo-
rical injustices are non-ordinary crimes in the
sense that the perpetrators had reasons to be-
lieve that their acts are compatible with the ef-
fective legal order. Perpetrators have reason to
believe that their acts are compatible with the
eﬀective legal order if they correctly assume
that they will not be prosecuted for them.
What makes an injustice historical, then, is not
the fact that it happened in the distant past or
that the involved persons are dead but that the
perpetrators know that the public prosecutor
and other legal authorities will remain inactive;
either because the code of law explicitly per-
mits or prescribes the injustice or because the
government, the law enforcement agencies and
the courts tolerate it. 
In order to give a more precise meaning to the
idea that a legal action can be criminal, I intro-
duce the concept of a ‘natural crime’. A natural
crime consists in the deliberate violation of na-
tural rights. For instance, assassinating someone
is a natural crime in so far as it violates knowin-
gly and willingly the natural right of that per-
son not to be assassinated. As I will state in
section III with greater accuracy, I presume that
the violation of natural rights can only be called
‘deliberate’ if the agent is morally competent, i.e.
has the capacity to understand what a natural
right is and what it consists in. Only morally
competent agents can commit natural crimes.
I shall now turn to my working definition of
 his torical injustice (WD): A historical injustice is
a (complex of) natural crime(s), which is (i) le-
galised and (ii) being perpetrated by morally
competent agents.
Since I will say more about the problem of
moral competence in the next section, I can
focus here on (i). I call an action ‘legalised’ if the
agent correctly assumes that he will not be pro-
secuted for performing it under the current legal
order; or if he correctly assumes that he will be
prosecuted for refusing to perform it. Legalisa-
tion can take the form of a legal command, legal
permission or legal toleration. Accordingly, a hi-
storical injustice is a natural crime, which is
being prescribed, permitted or tolerated by the
legal system.
The legalisation of a natural crime is itself a na-
tural crime; for it is a deliberate violation of na-
tural rights. This is obvious in the case of legal
commands, but less so for legal permissions
and legal tolerations. Why is it a violation of
natural rights on the part of the authorities
when they permit or tolerate natural crimes?
My answer moves along the following (roughly
Lockean) lines. Natural rights imply two or-
ders of duties. The first order aspect is well cha-
racterised by the introductory sentence of
Anarchy, State, and Utopia: “Individuals have
rights, and there are things no person or group
may do to them (without violating their
rights).”6 First order duties require people to
perform (or to abstain from) certain actions
that have the right-holder as the object. The se-
cond order duty, though, requires that violati-
ons of first order rights are being punished.
Their object is not the right-holder but the per-
petrator. 
If the legal order permits or tolerates the viola-
tion of first-order rights, it disregards its second
order duty to sanction such violations. The fai-
lure of the state to prosecute a first-order vio-
lation is a second-order violation of a natural
right. For this reason, the legalisation of a na-
tural crime is itself a natural crime.
I use the term ‘legalised’ in contrast to ‘legal’ in
order to take account of the fact that juridical
opinions regarding legality may diﬀer. The no-
tion of historical injustice, though, should not
depend on rather technical juristic questions.
Using ‘legalised’ instead of ‘legal’ is supposed
to make the notion of historical injustice suﬃ-
ciently robust. 
As an example for what I have in mind, one
may think of the ‘ordinary men’ who were
complicit in the Nazi genocide. Those who
slew Jews were not afraid of being charged for
murder by German courts, although, techni-
cally, they violated § 211 of the Reichsstrafge-
setzbuch of 1941 (which dealt with murder).
According to WD, the crucial question is
whether the historical agents have reasons to
believe that their actions are in accordance with
the eﬀective legal order or not. In the case of
the Shoa (Holocaust), they correctly assumed
that Nazi Germany had legalised natural cri-
mes.
WD is helpful in order to understand the ‘col-
lective nature’ of historical injustices. Consider
the following thought experiment: In 1818, an
individual named I invented a technical device
with which he murdered thousands of Chero-
kees. I acted as a lone operator. Neither did he
conspire with others nor did he receive help or
expect approval for his act. In fact, the public
is shocked and appalled by his mass murder.
The reason why one would not say that I did
commit a historical injustice, I presume, con-
sists in the ‘individual nature’ of his crime. We
use the notion ‘historical injustice’ in order to
address acts that were directed against indivi-
duals as members or representatives of groups.
The victims suﬀer as Jews, African-Americans
or Cherokees. Correspondingly, the perpetra-
tors do not act on the basis of merely personal
preferences but as members of a community, a
culture or as agents of organisations. 
Its collective nature distinguishes an act of hi-
storical injustice from crimes in the past that
had been committed or suﬀered by individuals
as individuals. It is important, however, to un-
derstand in what precisely the ‘collective na-
ture’ of historical injustice consists. I propose
to consider collective action as neither neces-
sary nor suﬃcient for the understanding of the
collective nature of historical injustice. If the
members of the Miller family killed dastardly
all the members of the Graham family in a
conflict about water rights, it is a case of col-
lective injustice, but it is no historical injustice,
even if it happened in the distant past and the
involved persons are deceased. 
A test of one’s intuition regarding a slightly
modified version of the above thought experi-
ment is instructive in this context. Imagine
that I, although the public is shocked and ap-
palled by his mass murder, is not being prose-
cuted. In this case, I think, one would not
hesitate to speak of the mass murder as a hi-
storical injustice although I had acted as a lone
operator and neither expected nor received
moral approval for his deeds. However, the fact
that the legal order tolerated I’s acts gives them
a ‘collective dimension’. For the political com-
munity upholds a legal order, which permits
individuals like I to put their preferences into
eﬀect. Thereby, it negates the natural rights of
the victims, even if, as in the thought experi-
ment, no member of the political community
conspired with the perpetrator or personally fa-
vours his deeds. In the thought experiment, the
‘collective nature’ of the mass murder consists
in the omission on the part of the political
community to prosecute a natural crime, an
omission which implies the negation of the
victim’s natural rights.
Thus, conceiving historical injustices as legali-
sed natural crimes, helps us to pinpoint in
which sense they have a ‘collective nature’.
They are not necessarily collective actions; ho-
wever, they are actions, or complexes of ac-
tions, which are in accordance with the
collective will of the political community that
upholds the legal order. 
I shall now turn to three objections to WD.
One may criticise that WD is not in harmony
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with the common philosophical view according
to which an injustice is historical if the victims
and the perpetrators are dead. Following this
view, the philosophical debate on historical ju-
stice deals with moral claims and obligations
that contemporaries have because of injustices
which their ancestors committed or suﬀered.7
In contrast to WD, the common philosophical
view calls the above-mentioned (fictional) as-
sassination of the members of the Graham fa-
mily by the Miller family a historical injustice,
even if it had been a criminal oﬀence at the
time. This approach has two disadvantages:
First, in everyday English, the word ‘historical’
can be used in order to emphasise the impor-
tance of an ongoing event as in ‘This merger is
a historical moment for our company!’. If ‘hi-
storical’ is understood in this sense, an inju-
stice can already be historical while it happens.
WD is compatible with this usage. Second,
and more importantly, it is common in the
philosophical literature to understand histori-
cal injustices not with regard to the internal
features of events but with regard to a relation
between the event and a claimant.8 A plain
murder metamorphoses into a historical inju-
stice by means of a claim on the part of the vic-
tim’s descendants. If there are no descendants,
then there are no (potential) claimants and,
thus, no historical injustices. I find this con-
tingency unfortunate. In contrast, WD defines
historical injustices by internal features of the
action (legality, natural criminality). The pas-
sage of time, the death of the involved persons
or the existence of (potential) claimants are ir-
relevant for the identification of an event as hi-
storical injustice. 
It is one thing to settle what a historical inju-
stice is and another to determine whether con-
temporaries have obligations or rights with
respect to them. One may distinguish between
hot and cold cases of historical injustice, hot
being those regarding which contemporaries
have obligations and rights.
The second possible objection criticises that
WD excludes core cases of historical injustice
such as (i) the consistent neglect of contractual
obligations against indigenous people or (ii)
the subjection of women. (i) Take, for instance,
the notorious Treaty of Waitangi (1840) in
which the British Crown promised to protect
the Maori against the uncontrolled and un-
wished infiltration of settlers.9 The historical
injustice, which the current restitution policy is
supposed to rectify, is conceived to consist in
the neglect of this contractual obligation. WD
has the awkward consequence that a much dis-
cussed case of historical injustice like this
would not count as such. I am prepared to bite
this bullet. It is, indeed, the case that, accor-
ding to WD, the breach of a treaty constitutes
no historical injustice, unless natural rights of
6
individuals are being violated. However, this
appears to be no serious disadvantage. For
what makes the breach of a treaty wrong, is,
first and foremost, the violation of the natural
rights of individuals.
(ii) Similarly, one may opine that the subjec-
tion of women in Victorian Britain should be
described as historical injustice but not as a
complex of natural crimes. Admittedly, it may
be unfamiliar to characterise the situation of
women in Victorian Britain with terms like
‘violation of natural rights’ and ‘natural crimes’.
If one consults Mill’s description of the legal
situation of married women in Victorian Bri-
tain, however, one learns that they were not
only disadvantaged, curbed in their professio-
nal ambitions and deprived of political rights,
but that they had no legal protection against
(what we would call) domestic rape.10 If rape is
a natural crime, the legalisation of it is a histo-
rical injustice. Hence, at least in this regard, it
is not true that my robust notion of historical
injustice is too narrow.
A third objection claims that, according to
WD, all historical injustices are essentially cri-
mes by the authorities in
so far as they legalise na-
tural crimes. As I already
mentioned, legalisation
can take the form of to-
leration. In such a case,
the authorities take no measures against natu-
ral crimes by non-state groups although they
would be capable of ending the crimes. Thus,
the claim that all historical injustices are es-
sentially crimes by the authorities has to be
taken with a pinch of salt. 
It is correct that, following WD, shocking na-
tural crimes, like mass murder, mass rape, mass
mutilation and so forth, do not count as hi-
storical injustice if they happen(ed) in a state of
nature, in civil war or in failed states. Howe-
ver, this is arguably not at variance with ordi-
nary usage. We address the genocide in Sudan
as historical injustice but not the unspeakable
attrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army that
operates mainly in Uganda. The reason is, I
presume, that the government of Sudan legali-
sed the mass murder, whereas the government
of Uganda is willing but so far unable to stop
the Lord’s Resistance Army.
Moral competence
In the previous sections, I suggested to distin-
guish between historical injustice and histori-
cal ill. Historical injustice implies, among other
things, that a class of persons bears moral re-
sponsibility for the violation of natural rights.11
This section is devoted to the question under
what conditions historical agents should be
considered as morally competent and, thus,
being capable of bearing moral responsibility
for some ill. I will argue that we should take
seriously the social and cultural ‘embedded-
ness’ of historical agents.
A standard condition of moral competence is a
person’s ability to grasp the relevant moral rea-
sons. We blame Alfred for φ-ing only if Alfred
has the capacity to understand that φ-ing is
wrong. Blaming presupposes, on the one hand,
that Alfred is able to comprehend the basic di-
stinction between morally right and wrong ac-
tions. We do not blame wild beasts for killing
a child since we assume that they lack the ac-
cording ability. On the other hand, Alfred
must have epistemic access to the right kind of
moral reasons. In the following, I use ‘moral
competence’ in the latter sense. A historical
agent is morally competent if he has access to
the right moral reasons; his failure to act upon
these reasons, then, is blameworthy since ‘he
should have known better’. An agent bears part
of the moral responsibility for a historical in-
justice, if he should have known that a com-
plex of actions, although legal, constitutes a
natural crime and that he is under a natural
duty not to participate in its execution.
The above-mentioned access condition is inher-
ently normative in the sense that it involves
statements about what an agent should have
known to be right in a certain situation. In the
following, I shall explore very tentatively
aspects that seem to be relevant for our
judgments regarding moral competence. 
Let me begin with a brief remark on absolu-
tism. Absolutism claims that all historical
agents could and should have known the right
moral reasons. Such a position would certainly
be worth considering more closely if moral na-
tivism were true. If our moral knowledge were
innate, the access condition seems to be fulfil-
led for all cognitively competent persons. Even
then, however, opponents could challenge ab-
solutism with the argument that cultural in-
fluences can and often do corrupt our natural
capacity to see what is right. The cultural con-
text deprives agents in some cases of their na-
tural moral competence. For this reason,
absolutism is implausible. 
In reply to this challenge, an absolutist could
assert on a Kantian note that it is the agent’s
recreancy and sloth, which keep him from
using his own wit. Since moral incompetence
is the result of the agent’s own vices, he or she
is to blame for them.
Let me abbreviate this discussion with the apo-
dictic assertion that the content of our moral
beliefs and the modes of our practical delibe-
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7ration are not innate. We acquire them in the
course of our acculturation. For this reason,
judgements about the moral competence of an
agent should take account of the cultural and
institutional matrix within which a person is
acting (contextualism). Naturally, the question
whether or not the members of a culture are to
blame for their failure to see the right moral
reasons is fiendishly diﬃcult to answer in many
cases. These diﬃculties notwithstanding, the
idea that the members of some cultures are not
to blame for violations of natural rights has
strong roots in common sense. 
One way to spell out contextualism could take
the following form: A historical agent is not to
blame for his immoral views if they are in com-
plete agreement with those of his social envi-
ronment (consensus criterion). The buttressing
idea of the consensus criterion is that it would
be too demanding to expect individual actors
to question what everyone else seems to take
for granted, or to see what no-one else seems to
be seeing. 
In the remaining part of the paper, I shall argue
that the consensus criterion is too coarse-
 grained and that one should distinguish bet-
ween appropriate and inappropriate causes of
societal consensus. 
The consensus criterion is too coarse-grained
since the fact that people agree on the accepta-
bility of immoral practices is not necessarily a
good indicator for their moral incompetence.
The criterion does not exclude cases in which
people have access to the right reasons but re-
fuse to give them proper weight in their prac-
tical deliberation since they conflict with their
self-interests. All slaveholders agreeing on the
moral admissibility of slavery does not warrant
the conclusion that they are morally incompe-
tent. It is perfectly possible that their consen-
sus stems from a collective rationalisation of
shared immoral interests and is, thus, a pro-
duct of wickedness and not of incompetence.
In order to take account of this point, I pro-
pose a finer-grained criterion. This criterion is
construed in analogy to norms that we accept
in the realm of theoretical beliefs. The rough
idea is that we would, for instance, criticise
average students if they were completely igno-
rant of the basic principles of evolution; but,
naturally, we do not blame Leibniz for his
ignorance concerning this matter. Our diﬀe-
rent assessments are easily explained by the fact
that most members of our society learn the
principles of evolutionary theory in school,
whereas Leibniz did not. He would have had to
formulate them by himself. Thus, blaming him
for his ignorance would simply amount to de-
manding too much, even of a genius like Leib-
niz. 
A similar point, I think, can be made with re-
spect to moral competence. According to the
exposedness criterion, a historical agent must
not be blamed for failing to see that certain so-
cial practices are natural crimes if this insight is
utterly unheard-of in his time and social world.
We must not expect ordinary members of a so-
ciety to be epistemic pioneers, i.e. people that
have the extraordinary ability to see what is
morally right when no-one else does. 
We seem to apply something like the exposed-
ness criterion when we exculpate members of
traditional societies in view of natural rights
violations. For instance, it is quite common to
draw a moral distinction between the British
slave trade and, say, the slave trade of the Che-
rokees. One reason appears to be that people
tacitly apply the exposedness criterion and as-
sume that the notion of a natural right not to
be enslaved was entirely alien to the Cherokee
culture, whereas it was not to the British cul-
ture at the time.12 It is important to note, ho-
wever, that exposedness is a matter of degrees;
whether the demands of the exposedness crite-
rion are being fulfilled will often be an object
of reasonable disagreement.13
Regarding the interpretation of the criterion,
the subjection of women in Victorian Britain is
an interesting test case. The idea that human
beings have rights and that ‘there are things no
person or group may do to them (without vio-
lating their rights)’ was certainly familiar to the
British society then. Moreover, one could find
a vigorous defence of women’s rights in the
books and articles of one of the most highly es-
teemed intellectuals of the nineteenth century,
John Stuart Mill. In this quite literal sense,
educated men were confronted with expressi-
ons of right moral reasons; thus, one may argue
that the exposedness condition is fulfilled and
that Victorian men are, by and large, to blame
for their failure to see what is right.
However, the question is whether the exposure
to ideas in books and articles is suﬃcient to
warrant the claim ‘that someone should have
known better’. A critic may argue that, in the
nineteenth century, the overwhelming majo-
rity of men found the idea of women’s eman-
cipation outrageous. John Stuart Mill’s
promotion of the cause was vehemently de-
nounced and ridiculed at the time. Even if
Mill’s male contemporaries knew about his
views or read his books and articles, it must
have been exceedingly diﬃcult for them to take
him seriously. In the light of their social con-
text, blaming them for their ignorance would
apply too high a standard.
Group pressure can undeniably be a corrup-
ting force in the process of belief formation.
But the presence of group pressure is no reli-
able indicator of moral incompetence. Fre-
quently, group pressure does not distort the
ability to grasp the right moral reasons but
aims at suppressing their public expression. It
is even plausible to assume that social pressure
exacerbates when people increasingly begin to
question the morality of common practices.
Thus, growing group pressure may be an indi-
cator for a process of enhancement of moral
competence, and not for its absence. 
On the other hand, there is certainly a strong
tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance. With
social pressures being intense, people have
powerful incentives to adapt their process of
practical deliberation to social expectations.
Spelled out properly, this may serve as an ar-
gument for the view that the subjection of
women in Victorian Britain was a historical ill
but no historical injustice. Group pressure in
combination with the tendency to reduce co-
gnitive dissonance obstructed the access to the
right moral reasons.
In reply to this view, one may emphasise the
presence of cultural patterns and role models
that facilitated or even demanded the use of
one’s own wit in order to examine the claims of
authorities and traditions and the defence of
one’s own beliefs in public. Martin Luther’s fa-
mous concluding remarks before the Diet of
Worms in 1521 are a case in point.14 Educated
people could and should have been aware that
the arguments, which were used to justify the
subjection of women, were below the common
standards of sound reasoning. In a society that
esteems personal courage in the critical exami-
nation of ideas, that acknowledges the exi-
stence of natural rights and that is used to open
discussion in the free press, the conditions for
the development of moral competence are aus-
picious. Thus, it appears not to be too deman-
ding to claim that people in Victorian Britain
could and should have grasped that women’s
natural rights are being violated. 
Notes:
(1) I wish to thank Dominique Kuenzle, Peter Schaber and
the anonymous reviewers for numerous helpful comments.
(2) Warren quoted in: Bittker 2003, 10.
(3) I wish to thank one of the reviewers for the last point.
(4) One may ask here, as one of the reviewers did, whether
this means that the advantages of profiteers are fair game for
dispossession by the authorities. My point is that profiteers
cannot argue against dispossession on the basis of historical
entitlement; but there may be other reasons against dispos-
session.
(5) 1904 soldiers of the Kaiserreich committed, perhaps, the
first genocide of the 20th century in what is now Namibia.
The German troops forced the insurgent Herero to take re-
fuge in the desert where they were cut oﬀ from food and
drink and died in the tens of thousands.
Intergenerational Justice Review
Volume 9 · Issue 1/2009
What happens when good people are put into an
evil place? Do they triumph or does the situation
dominate their past history and morality? 
/ Philip Zimbardo /
JFG_08_04_1  08.02.2009  19:41 Uhr  Seite 7
(6) Nozick 1999, 9.
(7) Pars pro toto: "Past-referring obligations are historical
when those who are supposed to be responsible for keeping
the promise, honouring the contract, paying the debt, or
making the reparation are not the ones who made the pro-
mise or did the deeds, but their descendants or successors."
(Thompson 2003, x). See also: Thompson 2000, 2001.
(8) In this understanding, the term 'historical injustice' is
only applicable if living persons have rights and obligations
on the basis of wrongs suﬀered by deceased people. Thus, a
historical injustice consists in ignoring, here and now, a hi-
storical obligation (which is an obligation of living people in
virtue of past wrongs). This is, presumably, the reason why
Sher (1981) refers to injustices in the (remote) past as 'an-
cient wrongs'; historical wrongs are necessary, but no suﬃ-
cient conditions of historical injustice. In a similar vein:
"Central to the topic of historical injustice, as I understand
it, is the question whether and how past injustice and, more
generally, wrongs can aﬀect present moral reasons for ac-
tion." (Pogge 2004, 117, italics mine).
(9) Goodin 2000.
(10) “(…) a female slave has (in Christian countries) an ad-
mitted right (…) to refuse to her master the last familiarity.
Not so the wife: however brutal the tyrant she may unfor-
tunately be chained to (…) he can claim from her and en-
force the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being
made the instrument of the animal function contrary to her
inclination.” (Mill CW 21, 285).
(11) I tend to say that a violation of natural rights counts as
a natural crime only if the perpetrator is morally competent.
One may object that such a usage misses the distinction bet-
ween the criminality of an act and the question of guilt. A
natural rights violation should be considered as a natural
crime even if the perpetrator is morally incompetent and,
thus, not to blame for it. Otherwise, one would have to say
that morally incompetent agents have the right to violate
natural rights. My reply is that morally incompetent agents
are beyond right and wrong and, hence, cannot possibly
have a right to commit natural crimes. Morally incompe-
8
tent agents can be bad and produce extremely ill conse-
quences but, like a wild beast that kills a child, they are no
criminals. 
(12) One aspect of the exposedness criterion, which some
may find disturbing, is that it relieves the members of the
‘worst societies’ of moral responsibility. Since violations of
natural rights – committed by members of morally incom-
petent societies – would not count as historical injustice, it
would follow that the perpetrators would not be culpable or
under special obligations of corrective justice. It is worthy of
note, though, that contextualism does not deny claims of
those who were harmed by historical ill; these claims, ho-
wever rest upon the ongoing distributional consequences of
past social practices, consequences that make the present
structure unjust.
(13) I thank one of the reviewers for urging me to make this
point more explicit.
(14) Luther’s words were: “Here I stand; I can do no other.
God help me. Amen.”
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Intergenerational Rights?
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Abstract: Past injustices demand a
 response if they have led to present de-
privation. But skeptics argue that there
is no need to introduce a self-contained concept
of 'historical justice' as our general concepts of
 justice provide all the necessary resources to deal
with present inequalities. A rights-based approach
to intergenerational issues has some advantages
when compared to rival approaches: those based
on intergenerational community, for example, or
on obligations deriving from traditional conti-
nuity. While it is possible to ascribe rights to
beings who are not presently in existence, the case
for ascribing rights to future generations is much
stronger than for past generations.
Serious wrongs leave their mark on the des-
cendants of their victims. The wrongs of sla-
very, for example, or of the dispossession of
aboriginal peoples, have clearly left their marks
– in the form of continuing deprivation – on
their respective descendant groups. There have
also, of course, been other great wrongs in the
past for which no descendant victim group can
be identified – for example, the cruelties suﬀe-
red by sailors in 18th-century European war-
ships. The fact that there is no descendant
victim group clearly suggests, however, that the
eﬀects of the wrong have been dissipated, for if
they had not, we would be confronted, in the
present, by an identifiable group of people
whose common life-situation had been decisi-
vely aﬀected by 18th-century naval brutality. In
yet other cases, the long passage of time has in-
terposed so many intervening events that the
connection with past wrongs has become too
tenuous: and there are also a few cases in which
relatively recent wrongs have left no percepti-
ble mark, for even though the victim group
subsists it has subsequently done well. But for
the most part, we pay serious attention to hi-
storical wrongs only when there is an identifi-
able group whose present deprivation
continues to display the eﬀects of past
 in justice.
There cannot be much doubt that present de-
privation motivates much of the concern for
injustice in the past. To lack concern about
past events may display lack of imagination: to
lack concern about present deprivation dis-
A
JFG_08_04_1  08.02.2009  19:41 Uhr  Seite 8
